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Many studies have examined whether citizens prefer direct or stealth democracy, or
participatory democratic processes. This study adds to the emerging literature that instead
examines the temporal aspect of citizens’ process preferences. We use a survey with a
probabilistic sample of the Finnish voting-age population (n  1,906), which includes a
measure of the extent to which citizens think democratic decision-making shouldmaximize
welfare today or ensure future well-being. Calling this dimension of democratic process
preferences future-oriented political thinking, we demonstrate that people hold different
but consistent views regarding the extent to which democratic politics should balance
between present and future benefits. We find that future-oriented political thinking is linked
to general time orientation, but the linkage varies across respondent groups. Politically
sophisticated individuals are less future-oriented, suggesting that intense cognitive
engagement with politics is linked with a focus on present-day politics rather than
political investment in the future.
Keywords: democratic process preferences, political attitudes, democratic myopia, general time orientation,
political trust
INTRODUCTION
In the complex contemporary world, many of the most acute political problems have
consequences that extend far into the future and cannot be discussed and decided upon in
terms of the present alone. However, democracies are not always particularly good at governing
for the long-term. Part of the problem lies in democratic institutions, whose inner logic is based
on short electoral cycles, making them far from ideal for making long-term policy investments
(Jacobs, 2011; MacKenzie, 2013). Another part of the problem, which this study focuses on,
concerns the political time perspectives of citizens. Where would citizens prefer to put the
emphasis of democratic decision-making when it comes to balancing between maximum welfare
today and future well-being? In this article, we argue that in order to fully grasp the nature and
extent of shortsightedness in democratic decision-making, we also need to understand the
temporal component in political attitudes.
This forces the question ofwhen into the research agenda (also Jacobs, 2016). There is an extensive
empirical literature that examines what democratic publics want, both in terms of what type of
democracy (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002) and what type of policies people desire (e.g.,
Wlezien, 2004). There is an equally vast literature on how public attitudes are formed (e.g., Toff and
Suhay, 2018). However, the question of where the temporal focus of citizens’ political preferences is
still an emerging area of research.
In psychological literature, time perception, i.e., “the degree to which one reflects upon the past, is
centered in the present, or anticipates the future” (Lennings, 2000, p. 40), has been shown to
significantly affect human behaviour as well as to vary between individuals (e.g., Strathman et al.,
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1994). This understanding, however, has been slow to take root
among political scientists, whose focus has perhaps been more on
who gets what and how, but not on when.
While previous research has focused on policy-specific
preferences regarding future-oriented thinking in politics, in
this study we examine future-oriented thinking in terms of
procedural preferences. Although striking a balance between
present and future needs is at its most concrete in the context
of specific policies, democratic governance is also a process,
which focuses more on some aspects and less on others. As
previous research on democratic process preferences shows,
people hold fairly stable attitudes regarding how they think
democratic governance should be organized. Much of the
focus in this literature has been on popular support for
different institutional arrangements, such as direct democracy
versus representative democracy (e.g., Bowler et al., 2007;
Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009). In this study, we investigate the
extent to which people prefer a democratic process that focuses
on the future versus the present. We seek to contribute to the
literature on democratic process preferences by suggesting that
democratic process preferences also include a temporal
dimension. To the more specific literature on temporal
political preferences, we wish to make more particular
contribution by suggesting that in addition to policy-specific
preferences, it is valuable to also address the more general
process preferences.
To this end, we utilize a question battery designed for
measuring the extent to which people think democratic
decision-making should focus on the present versus the future
and examine individual-level determinants of that preference.
Examining what we call “future-oriented political thinking,” our
findings underscore the relevance of analysing political attitudes
in terms of temporality. We find that people hold different but
consistent views regarding the extent to which democratic politics
should concentrate on present or future wellbeing. The findings
demonstrate that personality-related determinants, attachment to
politics and political ideology are more strongly connected to
differences in temporal preferences than life-cycle related
determinants.
CITIZENS AND DEMOCRATIC MYOPIA
The future manifests itself in different ways in democratic
decision-making. On the level of policy-making, certain
choices have, or at least might have, consequences that reach
far into the future. The temporal horizon of such issues varies
almost infinitely. Choices that are made regarding, for example,
the storage of nuclear waste has significance so far beyond the
human life span that no democracy or individual decision-maker
can truly grasp the temporal aspect of such a decision. In less
extreme situations, a “long-term policy” might be understood as
something that could have consequences beyond the current
electoral cycle, and probably stretch at least some decades into
the future. Most of what we know about the handling of such
issues in democratic decision-making comes from studies
targeting a specific policy domain, such as environmental or
pension policy or public debt (MacKenzie, 2013; 5ff; also; Jacobs,
2016). In this study, we do not examine policy preferences, but
rather the underlying question of where, in a normative sense,
citizens think that the emphasis of democratic choices should be,
in maximizing present or future wellbeing. This approach
sidesteps the difficult, or perhaps impossible, question of
defining exactly how far in the future a political choice must
extend in order to be considered “long-term.”Hence, we focus on
the normative foundations behind democratic process
preferences and leave the question of just how far the future
really is outside the scope of the analysis.
The mainstream of previous scholarship concerning the
temporal dimension of democracy has dealt with the
institutional causes of (alleged) democratic myopia. These
studies address the basic dynamic in democratic policy-
making, where politicians want to maximize likelihood for re-
election and investing in uncertain future well-being is risky,
especially if it means costs for voters today. Organized interest
groups may be hard to overcome because they are determined to
block reforms, which they feel will hurt their own interests
(MacKenzie, 2013). Furthermore, future-oriented policy-
making has extraordinarily high information costs, which
causes problems for decision-makers, even if they are willing
to bear the possible electoral costs for their choices (Jacobs, 2016).
Underlying these system-level explanations is the persistent
discussion of voter myopia. It proposes that voters, or citizens
more broadly, are shortsighted by nature and thus exert pressure
on elected officials to make policies that produce benefits in the
short-term, although politicians themselves might prefer more
future-oriented policies. This argument builds on the premise
that the ubiquitous human tendency to maximize short-term
gains instead of investing in uncertain future benefits is also
behind democratic myopia, because democracies are expected to
serve the people’s current needs (Thompson, 2010). In this view,
voter demands are seen as the root cause of democratic myopia.
Intuitively, it seems plausible that people are biased towards
preferring immediate rewards, both in everyday life and in
politics. Psychologists have demonstrated compellingly the
human tendency to opt for short-term gains over delayed
benefits and to prefer risk-avoidance over maximization of
possible gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Risk-avoidance
understandably emphasizes the present, because the future always
carries risks due to uncertainty. In a similar fashion, political
economists have discussed the occurrence of future discounting,
which also refers to situations where individuals have (good)
reasons to prefer immediate gains to protracted benefits.
However, the extensive literature review by Frederick et al.
(2002) finds inconclusive support for future discounting in the
field of political economy, suggesting that perhaps the
shortsighted tendencies are not quite as prevalent in political
behaviour as might easily be assumed.
The claim that shortsighted citizens are a key factor behind
democratic choices is more often taken as a given rather than
empirically tested. The few studies that explicitly address the issue
empirically, usually in the context of a specific policy choice, offer
a mixed bag of results. It is widely held that elected representatives
display risk-avoiding behaviour by trying to “avoid blame”
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instead of going for major policy wins, because they involve big
electoral risks (Weaver, 1986). This seems like a response to the
(assumed) risk-avoiding bias among voters. While risk-
avoidance, according to psychologists, is biased towards the
present, studies in political behaviour have indicated that the
connection between risk avoidance and temporal preferences is
mostly indirect. For example, the dominance of retrospective over
prospective evaluations among voters is sometimes interpreted as
supporting the idea that voter choices are typically shortsighted
(e.g., Nannestad and Paldam, 2000), although as empirical
evidence of democratic myopia this is, at best, incidental.
Thus far, the few explicit tests focused on policy preferences
in specific choice contexts. Healy and Malhotra (2009)
compared voter reactions to proposed investment in relief
aid for natural disasters and in future natural disaster
prevention. They reported conclusive voter support for the
short-term option (immediate relief aid) instead of the long-
term option (disaster prevention). The credibility of the finding
rests only on the link between aggregated candidate support at
the county level and the choice of investing in one of the two
policy options for handling natural disasters. The broader
question of whether citizen in general prefer policy-making
that concentrates on present or on future policy benefits
remains outside the authors’ scope.
Jacobs and Matthews (2012; 2017) examined the individual-
level drivers of citizen preferences for short-term policy benefits
in a series of tests with survey experiments and cross-sectional
surveys. Based on nationally representative samples of the US
voting age population, they did not find evidence of a “radically”
myopic electorate (Jacobs and Matthews, 2012, p. 932). In their
interpretation, the slight bias towards short-term policies stems
from distrust rather than shortsightedness: not being able to trust
politicians to deliver on long-term promises, people prefer the less
uncertain short-term option (also Cai et al., 2020). Consequently,
it seems that politicians’ fears of electoral retaliation for future-
oriented policy-making could be excessive (Jacobs and Matthews,
2012). Instead of blaming impatient voters for democratic
shortcomings in long-term policy-making, Jacobs and
Matthews suggest that perhaps the focus should be on
enhancing institutional trust among the public.
Attempting to address this issue, the same authors turned to
studying how political institutions might facilitate the public’s
trust in long-term policy commitments (Jacobs and Matthews,
2017). They designed survey and vignette experiments, which
varied the decision-making institution (local government,
United States federal government or military), to capture the
effect of varying trust in different institutions. As expected, long-
term policies received more popular support, when political
institutions, which were perceived as more trustworthy by the
people, introduced them.
To summarize, previous literature suggests that people
perhaps are not particularly politically shortsighted, although
they might show a slight preference for instantaneous benefits.
The scarce evidence comes exclusively from the North American
political context and experimental designs focusing on the choice
between a short-term and a long-term policy option. The finding
that temporal policy preferences largely depend on institutional
trust highlights the context-dependency of the matter, calling for
more evidence from other political realities.
Moreover, while extant research has studied policy choices in
concrete political issues, the more general attitudes concerning
the temporal focus of democratic decision-making and its
determinants remain unexplored; putting concrete policies
aside, how do people see the temporal trade-off between the
present and the future in democratic decision-making? Where do
they think the temporal focus of democratic governance should
be? These questions pertain to the temporal aspect of democratic
process preferences. By looking at the more general question of
future-oriented thinking in terms of process, not policy-specific,
preferences, we add another dimension to the field of study.
Whereas weighing the temporal trade-offs of two or more policy
options is unavoidably driven by whatever personal preferences
regarding the specific policy question or the decision-makers a
person has, our aim is to provide a more general understanding of
what the public expects of democratic governance in terms of
temporal emphasis. Whereas policy choices may also involve
pragmatic considerations of what, for example, is possible to
achieve technically in a given situation, we seek to tap into the
normative ideas about what people think democratic governance
should focus on—the present or the future. As previous research
regarding democratic process preferences has shown (e.g., Bowler
et al., 2007; Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009), people hold relatively
coherent opinions about who should govern in a democracy and
what the contours of the democratic process should look like. Our
overarching aim is to examine the temporal aspect of those
normative ideas about the democratic process.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN
FUTURE-ORIENTED POLITICAL THINKING
What factors could be associated with individual differences in
future-oriented political thinking? We suggest three different
explanatory pathways for why people feel differently about the
temporal aspect in democratic decision-making.
Life Situation
Studying citizen perceptions of the time horizons of political
decisions, a person’s current life situation and basic demographic
markers seem a plausible category of determinants. First, having
children might evoke moral responsibility for future well-being.
An extensive sociological literature has documented the
prevalence of intergenerational solidarity as a norm even in
high-income societies where the number of children per
woman is low (Graham et al., 2017). Longer life expectancies
may strengthen the emotional and material commitments to the
next generations even more. Having children could thus be
expected to translate into more care and compassion, also for
the future and not just for the present day. We used a measure
asking respondents whether they have children or grandchildren,
in order to capture the impact of having offspring (see
Supplementary Appendix for variable codings).
Second, we may assume that personal economic and
employment situations play a role in future-oriented political
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thinking, because support for future oriented policies requires
willingness to bear costs in the present without immediate gains
from policy-making. From the perspective of psychology, this is a
challenging choice, because individuals are not particularly good
at delaying personal gratification and biases prevent people from
making trade-offs between their and others’ well-being (Wade-
Benzoni et al., 2010). Therefore, people who are financially secure
may be more prepared to demonstrate future-oriented thinking.
We use a standard survey measure of gross annual income to
measure personal economic situation.
Third, people’s subjective assessment of their health may also
be an important determinant. Literature on health and political
behaviour shows, for example, that poor health decreases trust
towards political authorities (Mattila and Rapeli, 2018). We
expect a similar effect in terms of political time orientation,
because research suggests that political distrust increases
shortsightedness in political behaviour (see below).
Additionally, it seems likely that experiencing health problems
makes a person more focused on immediate rather than future
well-being. We rely on a widely used Likert scale on self-rated
health assessment (Jylhä, 2009).
Fourth, although the direction is unclear, age might be
associated with future-oriented political thinking. According to
conventional scholarly wisdom, expected remaining lifetime
should have a positive relation with risk-taking propensity
(e.g., Bommier, 2006). Since the future is always more or less
uncertain and therefore entails some degree of risk-taking, it
seems likely that an orientation towards the future would also be
stronger among the young in the political realm. In other words,
the longer the expected future a person has, the more likely that
person is to emphasize future-oriented politics. However,
experimental evidence demonstrates that priming people to
consider proximity of the end of their lives makes them think
more about the future and about the legacy they are leaving for
future generations (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2012), suggesting that
future-oriented thinking could instead be most pronounced
among the elderly.
Personality
Providing a different explanatory angle, personality is another
possible source of individual differences in political behaviour
(e.g., Mondak, 2010). In the current study, we are able to assess
the impacts of two personality-related indicators, which could
explain political time orientation, namely empathy and general
time orientation. Empathy refers to an individual’s ability to
understand other people’s views and feelings (Walter, 2012).
Empathy contributes to prosocial behaviour and is thus a
crucial component of social life (Cikara et al., 2011). While
empathy affects how people judge other individuals and help
others (Davis, 1994), it is also a product of social interaction with
other people (Grönlund et al., 2017). Psychologists have
unpacked the multidimensionality of empathy and often at
least two dimensions are distinguished: affective empathy
referring to reactions to other people’s emotions and cognitive
empathy referring to perspective-taking (Walter, 2012).
Empathy could play a role in future-oriented political thinking
because it forms the basis for an individuals’ ability to take the
perspective of known and unknown others. This includes people
who come after us, who are the main beneficiaries of long-term
policies. As discussed earlier, future-oriented policy-making
entails current taxpayers being willing to pay for initiatives
that will concretely improve future living conditions.
Understanding the feelings of others could therefore also
increase willingness to support future well-being, even at the
cost of current taxpayers. The survey included eight empathy
items that were modified and translated into Finnish from the
Questionnaire for Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE:
Reniers et al., 2011). These eight items measured the
perspective-taking dimension of empathy.
Another obvious personality trait is general time perception.
As has already been discussed, general time perception reflects the
extent to which an individual lives in and focuses on the present
or the future. It seems plausible that general time perception and
the domain-specific time orientation related to politics are closely
related; a person’s general outlook on time might also apply to
their political thinking. In fact, it might be reasonable to think
that a person’s time orientation in politics is merely an expression
of their more general time perception. There are, however, good
grounds to assume that the two could be separate concepts,
despite close relation. A wealth of evidence demonstrates that
the personal is surprisingly seldom political; research has typically
shown that personal experience is not a strong predictor of
political attitudes and behaviours (Egan and Mullin, 2012, p.
797). Based on this vast literature, it seems anything but clear that
general time orientation and future-oriented political thinking
would tap into the same conceptualizations. To test for this
possibility, we employ a widely used scale developed by
Gjesme (1975). It consists of six statements with Likert scale
response alternatives [completely/partly (dis)agree]. The items
have been formed into an additive index, where a higher score
indicates a future-oriented frame of thinking.
Political Attachment
A third possible pathway leads from an individual’s political
attachment to their future-oriented political thinking. We
examine three aspects of political attachment: political interest,
political (institutional) trust and ideological self-placement.
People who are strongly attached to politics are simply more
interested in politics (Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010). As an
important cursor of political attachment, political interest
offers a link to peoples’ political identity, value orientations
and their inclination to make political commitments. Political
interest also leads people to assess the pros and cons of different
political outcomes (Rebenstorf, 2004, p. 89). Moreover, political
interest has been found to correlate positively with patience,
suggesting that individuals who pay attention to politics are more
oriented towards future rewards. For instance, based on their
study of delayed gratification and voter turnout, Fowler and Kam
(2006) argue that many campaign issues revolve around policies
and political outcomes that lie way ahead in the future and may
take years to implement. Voters who only care about the present
may not be interested in paying attention to campaigns, but
rather focus on other issues that have more immediate effects on
their daily life (Fowler and Kam, 2006, p. 119). Similarly, it has
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been shown that politically interested individuals are more likely
to follow news and have better political knowledge and self-
efficacy, constructs that also correlate with future-oriented
thinking (Beal, 2011, p. 26–29).
Previous research looking into temporality in policy
preferences has highlighted the role of trust in politics and
political institutions as a key factor affecting time orientation.
The brief and conventional definition presents political trust as a
basic evaluative orientation among citizens towards the
government, which reflects perceptions of how well the
government is operating according to people’s normative
expectations (Hetherington, 1998, p. 791). While we
acknowledge the scholarly debate concerning the
dimensionality of political trust, it is beyond the scope of this
article to engage deeply in this discussion. We follow Hooghe
(2011), who argues that citizens’ trust judgements reflect the
prevalent political culture within the political system they are part
of; political trust can be conceptualized in terms of institutional
trust, consisting of trust in the parliament, the judiciary system,
public officials, politicians, political parties, the government and
the European Union. With a remarkably high Cronbach’s alpha
(0.935) and inter-item correlations ranging between 0.539 and
0.889, the unidimensional solution is strongly supported by the
data in the current study.
Despite a lack of studies on institutional trust and political
time orientation, there are several mechanisms that suggest a
correlation between political trust and time orientation. First,
trust in general is often seen as a resource for individuals to cope
with situations of uncertainty (Misztal, 1996, p. 18). Since the
future always involves a certain amount of uncertainty and risk,
we predict that politically trusting individuals are more future
oriented than those who are less trusting (Jacobs and Matthews,
2017; Cai et al., 2020). This mechanism likely depends on the fact
that institutional trust influences public policy support. When
citizens have high trust in the government, they are more likely to
comply voluntarily with government policies and regulations
(Tyler, 2006). Similarly, negative evaluations and political
distrust reduce public support for government actions and
motivations to accept implementation (ibid.). Therefore, it
seems plausible that this connection becomes even more
pronounced when policies and regulations lie far ahead in the
distant and uncertain future. Second, it has been shown that
political trust may have an effect on citizens’ risk-taking or risk-
averse dispositions with regards to policy preferences. In their
study on the effect of political trust on individual support for
land-taking compensation in China, Cai et al. (2020) found that
both risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals prefer one-time
benefits to yearly dividends and/or pension payments.
However, political distrust induces citizens to favour the one-
time benefit-option, while trusting individuals are more accepting
of compensations that lie further ahead in the future.
A person’s ideological disposition is another way to examine
the foundations of political attachment. We rely on the standard
self-placement on the left-right continuum, which has potential
significance for future-oriented political thinking. Subjective
political orientation is widely thought to pertain to risk-
relevant characteristics (Choma et al., 2014, p. 1). Previous
studies have demonstrated that political conservatives tend to
be more threat-sensitive and risk-averse than liberals. According
to Choma et al. (2014), political conservatism (vs. liberalism) is
connected to two relevant components, namely preference for
tradition (vs. social change) and acceptance (vs. rejection) of
inequality, both of which pertain to threat-sensitivity. Moreover,
the left-right dimension distinguishes people in terms of policy
questions, which are salient for the preference between present
and future wellbeing. Environmental issues are an obvious case in
point. Leftist ideology is associated with more pro-environmental
attitudes (e.g., Sargisson et al., 2020), which could plausibly be
linked with a more future-oriented political outlook as well. In the
context of Finnish politics, from where the data originate, the
liberal-conservative distinction is captured by left-right self-
identification. The reasoning is much the same as it is for
conservative-liberal identification: individuals on the right are
expected to be more traditionalist and conservation-motivated,
whereas those who place themselves on the left are more open to
change. These distinctions suggest that self-placement in the




Several research literature domains touch on the issue of future-
oriented political thinking but thus far it has avoided explicit
assessment. For example, an extant political science literature has
discussed citizens’ democratic policy preferences in terms of
whether they prefer representative, participatory or stealth- or
expert-driven democracy (e.g., Bengtsson andMattila, 2009). The
main focus in the literature is whether citizens prefer elections as
the mechanism for delegation of power, or some other model.
This research has not, however, addressed the normative ideas
about where the temporal focus of democratic decision-making
should be.
Another adjacent research area is the study of general time
perceptions within psychology. It builds on the understanding
that there is significant variation between individuals in terms of
the extent to which people think about the future (e.g., Strathman
et al., 1994). Psychologists have created different measures for
studying various aspects related to time orientation, such as how
long people’s planning horizons are (Lynch et al., 2010), how they
perceive time in general (Gjesme, 1975) and how people reason
about the future consequences of their actions (Strathman et al.,
1994). Among other findings, the literature has demonstrated
that future-oriented thinking has significant consequences e.g.,
for health-related behaviour (Seginer, 2009). However, the study
of time perceptions has not yet properly extended into the realm
of politics.
Similarly, futures studies have sought to empirically measure
future-oriented thinking. The focus is on “future consciousness,”
which refers to the extent that a person is aware of what “could or
should happen in the future” or is cognitively engaged in linking
the present with the future (Ahvenharju et al., 2018, p. 2). A
thorough inventory of the literature in the field reveals a wide
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range of ideas and measures associated with future-oriented
thinking, including personal traits such as optimism, courage
and risk-taking, but none touches upon political attitudes
(Ahvenharju et al., 2018, p. 6).
Despite useful conceptualizations, none of the existing
measures is directly applicable to the study of political
attitudes, or the more specific question of temporality in the
democratic process. There are no standardized survey items or
scales for measuring public attitudes towards the degree to which
the democratic process should be “centered in the present, or
anticipate the future” (Lennings, 2000, p. 40). There is, however, a
question battery that is available in a survey (n  1,906)
conducted in Finland in 2019 among a probability sample,
which was representative of the voting-age population. The
survey respondents were recruited from a panel administered
by Qualtrics so that the required quotas for age, gender and place
of residence were filled. The resulting sample represented the
voting-age population in terms of these characteristics. Qualtrics
was also used as the software for conducting the survey online.
We use the following survey items to construct an index of future-
oriented political thinking:
The following statements describe politics on a general level.
What do you think about them? (Completely agree; partly agree;
partly disagree; completely disagree; cannot say)
1. Decision-makers must try to solve problems now that are
still decades away in the future.
2. Today’s voters must be prepared to reduce their standard
of living, if it is necessary for the well-being of future
generations.
3. The world changes so fast that it does not pay to make
political decisions that reach far into the future.
4. Voters’ demands are binding for decision-makers even
when they might threaten the well-being of those who
come after us.
5. Politics should try to solve contemporary societal
problems, not future ones.
6. Future living conditions must be taken into account
carefully in decisions made today.
7. Decision-makers must invest in solving future problems,
even if it means that taxpayers face costs now.
8. Time will solve future problems, regardless of political
decisions made today.
The battery was developed for the purpose of gauging
individuals’ reasoning on temporality in democratic decision-
making. Consisting originally of 12 items, we utilize the above
eight items, which form the most robust composite variable.
These eight items, include two types of statements. One set of
items measure the basic question of whether the respondent
believes, in general, that the future should be considered in
present political decision-making (statements 1, 3, 5, and 8).
From the perspective of democratic process preferences, these
items ask respondents to state their preference regarding the
extent to which democratic policies should focus on the present
or on the future. The other items extend this purely normative
discussion to measuring the extent to which the respondent
thinks costs should be bore now even if policy benefits
materialize in the future (statements 2, 4, 6, and 7). In order
to be a genuinely general measure of temporal process
preferences, as opposed to policy-specific, the item wordings
are intentionally rather abstract.
We do not claim that these two dimensions are the only
conceivable ones for measuring normative ideas about the
temporal focus of democratic governance. However, what we
do argue is that the two are highly relevant dimensions of those
ideas in terms of democratic process preferences. The first one
pertains to the overall value attached to the core question of what
democratic governance should emphasize—the present or the
future. The second one attempts to measure the same
perceptions, but with a more concrete reference to those
choices that the democratic process is forced to make between
present and future wellbeing. In our attempt to measure a general
attitude instead of a policy-specific one, we obviously do not
anchor the questions in any policy sector. However, given that the
democratic process exists to produce policies, the items also refer
to this fact.
As all constructs aimed at measuring abstract ideas, also the
above survey measure involves some dilemmas. First, from the
respondents’ viewpoint, the topic is demanding and designing
simple and understandable question wordings is difficult. Second,
social desirability bias might cause respondents to over-
emphasize future-orientation. To counter this potential caveat,
some items have been designed to make it more acceptable to
express less future-oriented political attitudes. Moreover, due to
the long and sprawling theoretical trajectories from adjacent
disciplines, conceptual boundaries easily get blurred. The items
do not tap into a perception of political time in general, because
they do not measure the degree to which a person reflects upon
decision-making in the past (Lennings, 2000). In a similar
fashion, the items are not either concerned with perceptions of
the future itself, that is, how uncertain the respondents think
future is or how they see themselves in the future. While these
aspects are undoubtedly part of the bigger equation of how, all
things considered, people perceive of temporality in politics, these
items have a more constrained focus, namely that they examine
the temporal aspect of democratic process preferences.
Admittedly, respondents are likely to also think in terms of
policy areas when they answer the questions, and not purely in
terms of a process. They might also have responded differently to
some of the items depending on policy area, if the items had been
anchored to specific policy issues. However, as the results
reported below and in the Supplementary Appendix
demonstrate, people hold consistent opinions about where the
temporal focus of the democratic process should be, suggesting
that the responses are not dramatically affected by underlying
policy-specific considerations.
The battery was pre-tested using a sample consisting mainly of
university students (n  184). The pre-test showed high internal
scale reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.705 and average
inter-item covariance of 0.144. It was then included in the general
population online survey (n  1,906) described above. The survey
showed even higher internal consistency across the items than
the pre-test. Including only factors with an eigenvalue ≥1 and a
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cut-off ≥0.500 factor loadings, the items loaded on a single factor
(see Supplementary Appendix Table A2). Both Cronbach’s
alpha (0.844) and average inter-item correlation (0.453)
suggest very high scale reliability. Further validity checks have
been included in the Supplementary Appendix. In addition to
high scalability, they demonstrate that the composite measure has
the expected association with relevant policy-specific attitudes,
further suggesting that the measure functions as intended.
ANALYSIS
Table 1 below displays percentages of respondents who (dis)agree
to the eight items that comprise the measurement of future-
oriented political thinking.
The responses demonstrate much disagreement across all
items, suggesting that socially desirable responses biased
towards future orientation are not very widespread. The
broadest consensus is in the statement, “Decision-makers must
try to solve problems now that still lie decades away in the future,”
with 80% of respondents agreeing to the statement. Other items
show more disagreement. On average, approximately 10% of the
respondents declined to respond, suggesting that some
respondents found it difficult to provide a meaningful
response to the statements.
The one-dimensional result in the factor analysis (principal
component analysis) allows us to safely use the factor scores,
calculated using the regression method, as the dependent variable
in the subsequent regression analyses. The factor scores represent
the extent to which a respondent engages in future-oriented
political thinking; for every respondent, a larger factor score
means more future-oriented political thinking. The population
mean is 0, which approximates the average placement of the
surveyed individuals in terms of their future-oriented political
thinking. Every step in the positive (negative) direction from 0
means one unit change in standard deviation from the
population mean.
In order to examine the explanatory power of each possible
type of explanation (life situation, personality, political
attachment), we first entered each block containing the
different explanatory models separately and then included
them all in a full model. In addition to the theorized variables,
we control for gender and education, which are among the most
widely used “usual suspects” among individual-level
determinants of political attitudes and behaviours. Given the
cross-sectional nature of the data, our aim is to investigate
associations between certain individual-level determinants and
the dependent variable, rather than to suggest causal connections.
Figure 1 shows the point estimates for each explanatory
variable and their confidence intervals (see Supplementary
Appendix Table A4 for full results of the linear regression
analyses). While the explanatory power of the models is
modest, the picture is clear and every explanatory model
seems to have some relevance. Income is the only variable in
the life situation model, which shows no statistical significance.
Young age, high education and good health all predict high
future-oriented political thinking. The fact that younger
individuals are more future-oriented politically is probably also
captured by the negative coefficient for having offspring. Gender,
which is included in the life situation model for practical reasons,
shows that women are politically more future-oriented than men.
Empathy is unrelated to future-oriented political thinking. It
seems that being sensitive to other people’s well-being and the
ability to put oneself in the shoes of unknown others does not
translate into a more future-oriented political outlook. From the
perspective of long-term policy-making, this may also imply that
public support of long-term policies does not require widespread
empathy among the electorate. General time orientation, on the
other hand, stands out as a particularly significant predictor in the
personality model, suggesting that having a future-oriented
outlook on life in general is associated with a similar
orientation in the political realm.
All the variables included in the political attachment model
demonstrate statistically significant relationships with future-
oriented political thinking. As previous research suggests,
political trust has a strong, positive association, which
confirms that trust in the political system is linked with a
willingness to place more emphasis in future-oriented politics.
It seems that a lack of trust in the ability of political institutions
and actors to deliver uncertain future benefits is associated with a
less future-oriented political outlook. As expected, a leftist
orientation predicts more future-oriented political thinking.
The negative coefficient for political interest means that
politically engaged individuals are more focused on the







Decision-makers must try to solve problems now that are still decades away in the future 80.2 12.4 7.4
Today’s voters must be prepared to reduce their standard of living, if it is necessary for the well-being
of future generations
54.9 35.3 9.8
The world changes so fast that it does not pay to make political decisions that reach far into the future 33.9 55 11.1
Voters’ demands are binding for decision-makers even when they might threaten the well-being of
those who come after us
41.4 44.7 13.9
Politics should try to solve contemporary societal problems, not future ones 55 35 10.1
Future living conditions must be taken into account carefully in decisions made today 69.7 20.7 9.7
Decision-makers must invest in solving future problems, even if it means that taxpayers face
costs now
52.8 36.1 11.1
Time will solve future problems, regardless of political decisions made today 30 56.9 13.2
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present than on future-oriented politics. This stands in clear
contrast with the above explained expectation, suggesting a
very different interpretation. It seems that highly attached and
partisan individuals are more likely to view politics in terms of
shortsighted and partisan electoral politics, for which it is
crucial either to get large benefits quickly when in government
or to turn electoral fortunes around when in opposition. Such
an approach leaves little room for long-term policy concerns,
which could plausibly lead to the negative relationship with
future-oriented political thinking that we are seeing in the
results.
Despite a weak bivariate correlation with future-oriented
political thinking, general time orientation stands out as the
strongest single predictor. However, as Figure 1 shows, the
large confidence intervals for general time orientation suggest
considerable individual variation in terms of how strong this
relationship is. Given that the two temporal orientations are also
conceptually closely linked, we ran interactions with general time
orientation and all the other explanatory variables to examine
whether and how the strength of the association varies between
respondent groups. In the figures below, we report the two
instances where we found statistically significant interactions.
The figures show the marginal effect of general time orientation
on future-oriented political thinking across the respondent
groups, when all other explanatory variables are set to
their means.
FIGURE 1 | Determinants of future-oriented political thinking.
FIGURE 2 | Impact of general time orientation on future-oriented political
thinking across age groups.
FIGURE 3 | Impact of general time orientation on future-oriented political
thinking across levels of political interest.
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A notable observation is that the impact of general time
orientation differs between age groups (Figure 2). General
time orientation is more closely connected to future-oriented
political thinking among 31–45-year-olds and 46–60-year-olds
than for the youngest and the oldest age groups. In other words,
the youngest and the oldest age groups rely less on general time
orientation when forming attitudes about future-oriented
political thinking. As discussed, there are plausible reasons for
why both youth and old age might be associated with more
future-oriented thinking. Our findings suggest that people in both
life situations have more nuanced thoughts about their temporal
political preferences, although the young are more future-
oriented than the elderly. People in middle-age, on the other
hand, seem not to make much of a difference between their
everyday temporal orientation and their temporal orientation in
the political domain.
General and political future orientations are much more
closely connected among those who are not at all interested in
politics (Figure 3). The contrast is most obvious with those who
say they are very interested, suggesting that a strong cognitive
attachment to politics is associated with a larger gap between
general and political time orientations. In other words, people
who follow politics closely, do not rely as much on general time
perceptions to form their future-oriented political thinking. We
interpret this as indicating that politically interested individuals
hold well developed and nuanced political attitudes, which they
(to some degree) keep separate from their attitudes in other
realms. In the current case, this “pigeonholing” means that
although people might be generally future-oriented, they might
not be that politically—and vice versa.
To conclude, while general time orientation is the strongest
predictor of future-oriented political thinking, the association is
not the same across all relevant explanatory variables. Although a
more future-oriented outlook on life for many people spills over
to their attitudes toward temporality in democratic decision-
making, this is not always the case and the bivariate correlation
between the two is not particularly strong. Our interpretation is
that the two are close, but nevertheless separate concepts and that
the temporal aspect of democratic process preferences cannot be
adequately captured through a measure of general time
orientation.
DISCUSSION
Several valuable efforts by scholars representing a diversity of
research fields, such as economics, psychology and policy
sciences, have focused on the temporal aspect of democratic
politics from different analytical angles, such as (voter)
rationality, risk-taking, cognitive biases and policy preferences.
However, a more general understanding of citizen attitudes
toward the temporal dimension of democratic decision-making
has been lacking. In a world where the most important societal
problems require long-term solutions, understanding what
citizens think about the temporal dimension of democratic
politics is essential. Moreover, assumptions about citizen
myopia have not yet been very rigorously tested.
Empirically, a key takeaway for the study of democratic
process preferences is that citizens have consistent and varying
attitudes concerning the temporal dimension of democratic
decision-making. The attitudes are one-dimensional across the
eight-item survey measure and distinguishable from related
concepts. This indicates that citizens not only care about how
democratic power structures should be arranged institutionally,
but they also hold consistent opinions on how democratic
processes should balance between the needs of today and the
prosperity of tomorrow. The when in democratic governance
clearly matters for citizens.
We examined three plausible explanatory pathways for
individual-level differences in future-oriented political
thinking. The strong negative impact of age suggests at least a
life-cycle related effect. It supports the idea that expected
remaining lifetime is positively linked to emphasizing
investments in future welfare. However, given that the data is
cross-sectional, we cannot rule out the possibility that the age
effect is in fact a generational effect and not an effect related to life
situation. Political trust demonstrates the assumed positive
relationship with future-oriented thinking. This confirms
previous findings, according to which trust in political
institutions to deliver on their promises is a key determinant
of support for long-term policies. It seems obvious that the same
mechanism is at work even when it comes to the underlying,
normative ideals. Interestingly, the connection with political
interest is negative, suggesting that individuals who are likely
to follow politics closely, emphasize a focus on present-day well-
being. A possible interpretation is that attentiveness to the
partisan realities of democratic politics makes people value
immediate policy rewards, because they are acutely aware of
the fragility of long-term political commitments.
The finding that leftist ideology is connected to more future-
oriented political thinking could be indicative of a deep
ideological gap. The question, whether democracies ought to
emphasize present-day or future wellbeing is, after all, a
fundamental one and the left-right divide is a significant
predictor of that preference, even when controlling for a host
of other factors. It seems that ideological differences, which often
manifest themselves on the level of actual policies, can partly also
be attributed to different normative conceptions about what,
temporally, should be the focus of democratic policy-making.
The finding has potentially profound consequences for our
understanding of the significance of ideology for democratic
policy-making, but it calls for more investigation and evidence
from other political contexts.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, general time orientation stands out as
the variable with the most explanatory power. On average, people
who are more future-oriented in their everyday lives are so even
in the political realm. However, important differences between
respondent groups also exist. General time orientation is a better
proxy for future-oriented political thinking among people
between the ages of 30–60 than for the youngest or the oldest
age groups. Similarly, it is also a weaker predictor of future-
oriented political thinking among politically attentive individuals.
This suggests that people with a high cognitive capacity and a
high engagement with politics are less likely to use general time
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orientation as a heuristic to express future-oriented
political thinking. The findings thus support the idea that
future-oriented political thinking should be distinguished from
general time orientation—both conceptually and empirically.
It is also interesting to note the insignificance of income and
empathy, both of which according to existing research are plausible
drivers of future-oriented political thinking. One explanationmay be
that standard psychological indices fail to capture empathy towards
future generations that are a very specific, abstract type of out-group
in current societies. The impact of having (grand)children also had
only a moderate, negative impact. This also may partly depend on
measurement, but these observations nevertheless give the
impression that factors related to personality and political
attachment seem more important than life-cycle related
determinants. Overall, the findings demonstrate understandable
linkages about the way people reason about the temporal aspect
of politics. Broadly speaking, the findings support one of the most
fundamental insights which have emerged from the research on
attitude formation, that personal life circumstances often have a
surprisingly negligible impact on political attitudes (Egan and
Mullin, 2012). Instead, in the case of future-oriented political
thinking, the most important explanations seem to be personality
differences and a person’s cognitive attachment to politics, including
their ideological disposition.
For the more specific field of research concerned with the
temporal dimension of democracy, the primary implication of the
findings is that citizenmyopia, which forces policy-makers to take
shortsighted decisions, may not be as severe a problem for
democracy after all. The assumption about widespread myopia
may be an overstatement and, to some degree, an inaccurate
picture of the citizenry. Many citizens agreed to statements
describing a future-oriented style of democratic politics and
there are systematic and understandable individual-level
differences in the degree to which they do so. Studying the
temporal aspect of political attitudes, therefore, seems like a
meaningful exercise, although it has largely been neglected by
mainstream scholarship on political attitudes. The temporal
dimension of democratic politics should feature heavily on
researchers’ agenda now that the solutions to the most
pressing political problems require sacrifices in the present day
in order to secure benefits in the future. When these political
decisions that ensure well-being in the future are made, the
crucial question becomes how legitimate they are considered
by the public at large and current generation. Understanding
the role that future plays in citizens’ political thinking may help us
anticipate and solve legitimacy deficits of future-oriented policies.
The extent to which our survey measure and findings are
replicable across national contexts remains to be examined.While
some important predictors of future-oriented political thinking
undoubtedly remain outside our empirical scope, subsequent
research should also revisit the role of empathy more
thoroughly. What distinguishes future-oriented political
thinking from personal future orientation is the fundamentally
collective nature of the former. Our findings that perspective-
taking and general feelings towards outgroups are not associated
with future-oriented political thinking could, therefore, imply
that future-oriented political thinking is a fairly individualistic
attitude or alternatively, that solidarity towards future
generations operates via different causal mechanisms than
general empathy. Furthermore, our measures tracked citizens’
attitudes towards the political present and the future, but there are
studies suggesting that understanding retrospective viewpoints
also increases support for long-term policies (Nakagawa et al.,
2019). Citizens’ perceptions of the political past therefore remain
another open question, which research into political time
orientations should examine.
While we have argued and showed that future-oriented
political thinking is normatively desirable and an
empirically measurable concept, the question of how to
foster it remains outside the scope of this article. There is
some evidence that citizen deliberation in so called mini-
publics can increase consideration of future generations’
perspectives in long-term planning (Kulha et al., 2021;
MacKenzie and Caluwaerts, 2021), but the role of political
socialization or education, for example, remains to be studied.
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